In I978, Ernest Fitzgerald sued Richard Nixon, and in I994, Paula Jones sued Bill Clinton. In a landmark but closely divided I982 opinion, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court sided with Nixon and against Fitzgerald.' What does this mean for Jones and Clinton today?2 Ed Meese speaks for many when he insists that Nixon protects Presidents only for presidential conduct and that extending immunity to Clinton's pre-presidential conduct would be a huge and unprincipled stretch that would place Bill Clinton above the law.3 Other commentators aren't so sure that Nixon itself was rightly decided but are sure that Clinton's claim is much weaker. Terry Eastland has argued * Southmayd Professor, Yale Law School.
[Vol. 108:701 congressional law, presidential edict, or judicial decree."2 If the President and federal courts cannot censor citizens with a congressional law, it would be odd to think they can do so without such a law. As with Section 6, the First Amendment is best read not to bar, by expressio unius, citizen freedoms against courts and executives, but rather to invite, by analogy, these unenumerated freedoms implicit in constitutional structure.
It might be argued that the structural reasoning outlined thus far should go no further. Ordinary citizens, the people, may well enjoy unenumerated rights, especially if collective self-government is at stake -this principle is the heart of the Ninth Amendment's affirmation of the people's unenumerated rights.'3 But, it might be said, unenumerated rights and immunities for governmental officials qua officials are a very different kettle of fish.
Are they really? Always? Consider a federal judge who, in the course of her published judicial opinion, criticizes some person who then brings a libel suit. Our judge is not a Senator or Representative; nor is she speaking "in either House." Must we read Section 6 by expressio unius to imply that our judge enjoys no analogous immunity in performing her public function and doing the people's business? Must we reject even a "constitutional common law" immunity that might be modifiable at the margins by statute?14 Surely expressio unius does not require this rigidity; and we should note that, since our nation's Founding, courtroom litigants have enjoyed absolute common law immunity from libel -an immunity arguably constitutionalized in the First Amendment Petition Clause.15 Should a judge have less freedom of speech than a litigant?16 In a working democracy under law, judges -like Senators, Representatives, and ordinary citizens -tion to Congress, and to give a statement of reasons for any veto he hands down.22 In performing his high constitutional duties of democratic deliberation, the President may need to speak in ways that criticize and anger powerful people. In this situation too, libel suits would offend the basic structure of the Constitution -for precisely the same reasons as would libel suits against Senators, Representatives, and judges.23 It would be downright silly to argue by expressio unius that the President lacks absolute immunity from libel merely because the clauses governing State of the Union messages, recommendations, and vetoes are less explicit than Article I, Section 6; so too, it would be obtuse to recognize absolute immunity for these and only these three communications (under expressio unius) while muzzling the President the rest of the time under penalty of libel lawsuits.
This examination of the Speech or Debate Clause suggests that it is best read not to bar analogous immunities of coordinate branches but rather, if anything, to invite them. And the same holds true, we shall argue, for its companion, the Article I, Section 6 Arrest Clause. If Representatives and Senators should not be impeded ("arrested") by certain private litigation while performing the people's business (while "at session"), this Arrest Clause immunity should not bar, and if anything might invite, analogous immunities for members of coordinate branches while performing the people's business.24 22 See U.S. CONST. art. II, ? 3; art. I, ? 7. 23 Once again, our logic tracks the Court's:
[T]he same general considerations of public policy and convenience which demand for judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for damages arising from acts done by them in the course of the performance of their judicial functions, apply to a large extent to official communications made by heads of Executive Departments when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by law. Spalding, i6i U.S. at 498. Consider also the words of Framer James Wilson:
In order to enable and encourage a representative of the publick to discharge his publick trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion offence. JAMES 
Wilson saw members of all three branches as representatives of the public. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 597 (I969)
. 24 We do not here address what, if any, immunities might be appropriate for state officials under the federal Constitution. These immunities raise different issues, because unlike the President and federal judiciary, state officials are not coordinate to Congress.
We also bracket the issue whether state governors should enjoy immunity under state constitutions from state law suits. Although many state constitutions feature clauses for state legislators analogous to Article I, ? 6, these constitutions differ from the federal template in two key respects. Nor does any of this analysis violate the language or history of Section 6 or even the formal rule of expressio unius, properly understood. Section 6 nowhere explicitly rejects coordinate immunitiesstatutory, common law, or constitutional. The Framers simply provided more details about the legislature in their prolix Article I than about coordinate branches; so more must be left to sensible structural inference when dealing with the sparser Articles II and III. Textual specification of legislative immunities might have been especially important to some Framers because the practical protection of these immunities would be committed to the other two branches in enforcing and adjudicating concrete cases. Whatever implicit immunities were appropriate for those other branches, it might have been thought, were effectively self-executing -effected by the President's refusal to enforce certain processes against himself, and judges' refusal to entertain certain suits against judges -and so perhaps needed less textual emphasis.25 And even under a stringent expressio unius theory, Section 6 could be read merely to set out those governmental immunities that Congress cannot in any way qualify by statute.
Supreme Court case law also emphatically rejects the notion that Section 6 precludes implied immunities for coordinate branches. remedy for intra-litigation wrongs occurs within the lawsuit itselfby appeal -rather than by a collateral damage action.28
B. Separating the Two Tiers of Immunity
In a lengthy and important footnote, the Nixon v. Fitzgerald majority properly rejected a wooden expressio unius reading of Article I, Section 6, arguing that "a specific textual basis has not been considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity."29 But the Court's desire to find a quick answer to Nixon's problem blinded it to the architecture of Section 6. To see this, we must carefully pull apart the two types of immunity mentioned in Article I. One type is "Immunity From Arrest": legislators' temporary immunity from litigating even private lawsuits while "at the Session" of Congress as public officers. 36 The idea here may be that, in order to bring the outside world under the rule of law, courts must exist and function; but in order to function, they must adopt special rules for in-court wrongs. One can also argue that a judicial action, even if egregiously wrong, is not "unconstitutional" so long as the erring judge has "jurisdiction." Jurisdiction is the right to decide -either way -and thus, in effect, the right to be "wrong." 37 For the time being, while engaged in the public service, he is divested of self and of private concernment, and, as it were, dedicated in time and mind to the public service. Nor need there be private injury as a necessary consequence. There may be a time, when the privilege of these functionaries ceases, -when the special duty, that sets them apart to the public service has been performed, and their return to private life is clear and unquestioned, when the public interest no longer demands their protection, and the private right to their attention can commence, and they be held answerable as any other citizen.
Id. at I131.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court put a similar gloss on Article I, ? 6: In order to render this provision available to the extent of its necessity, it will not do to construe the words privilege from arrest in a confined or literal sense. A liberal construction must be given to these words upon principle and reason. It is just as necessary for the protection of the rights of the people that their representative should be relieved from absenting himself from his public duties during the session of congress, for the purpose of defending his private suits in court, as to be exempt from imprisonment on execution. If the people elect an indebted person to represent them, this construction of the constitution must also be made to protect his rights and interests, although it may operate to the prejudice of his creditors; but the claims of the people upon his personal attendance are paramount to those of individuals, and they must submit. nity -stopping the clock on a lawsuit until litigation can occur without disruption of the defendant's public duties. 46 Though a strict expressio unius reading might limit the Arrest Clause to "Senators and Representatives," structural considerations tug the other way. Consider, for example, the Vice President. Surely he is not a "Senator or Representative," strictly speaking,47 and yet under the Constitution, he is empowered to preside over the Senate and cast a tie-breaking vote.48 If he were subject to civil arrest while Congress was in session, he could be wrenched away from these weighty constitutional duties of democratic deliberation by a single private plaintiff, in clear violation of the spirit and logic -but not the letter -of the Arrest Clause.
The structural constitutional logic undergirding temporary immunity applies with even greater force to the President. Unlike federal lawmakers and judges, the President is at "Session" twenty-four hours a day, every day. Constitutionally speaking, the President never sleeps. The President must be ready, at a moment's notice, to do whatever it takes to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution and the American people: prosecute wars, command armed forces (and nuclear weapons), protect Americans abroad, negotiate with heads of state, and take care that all the laws are faithfully executed. We should hesitate before arming each citizen with a kind of legal assault weapon enabling him or her to commandeer the President's time, drag him from the White House, and haul him before any judge in America.
What's more, the President is the only person for whom the entire 
7I5 ment, the Constitution itself assures that plaintiffs will not have to wait more than eight years.55
But eight years is a long time -much longer than any "Session" of Congress under Article I, Section 6 -and so perhaps the Section 6 analogy breaks down at precisely that point. On the other hand, eight years is a lot shorter than eternity, which is how long the Nixon Court said Ernest Fitzgerald had to wait. On this point, at least, it may be politically awkward for the Court to distinguish Nixon: aren't Democratic Presidents entitled to the same solicitude as Republican Presidents? (And on the facts of the Jones case, one may well ask if Paula Jones can equitably complain about delay after she waited three years to file her complaint.) 56 If sensible structural inferences lead us to think that a President, under the logic of Article II, merits an immunity akin to Section 6 "Arrest" immunity, it becomes important to refine further the functional concept of civil arrest. Our legal order has long distinguished between damage suits for past, discrete wrongs, and injunctive suits to end ongoing harm. In effect, we should distinguish between civil damage arrests and ongoing harm injunctions. In arrest scenarios, plaintiffs may be obliged to wait, but interest payments presumably can make up for lost time. Civil actions arising out of ongoing harms continuing possession of a steel mill in Youngstown,57 or a hypothetical divorce or child custody suit involving a sitting President -are quite different.58 Putting the point more textually, perhaps one could say that an ongoing harm is functionally one kind of "Breach of the Peace" and thus lies outside the proper scope of arrest immunity.59
C. Nixon Revisited
Not only does temporary immunity from "civil arrest" make good sense from the perspective of constitutional structure and policy, but it also makes the most sense of the historical evidence offered up by the 55 
U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, ? i ("No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice ....").
In rare cases, the Amendment would allow a person to serve as President for ten years. See id. 56 See infra Part II. 57 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (I952). 58 The circle of potential plaintiffs in a divorce or child custody case is, of course, much smaller than the circle of potential plaintiffs who might seek damages for any past act, public or private. Injunctive suits arising out of a sitting President's private business concerns are also imaginable -consider, for example, a tort injunction to abate an alleged nuisance on land owned by the President. But if a sitting President deemed such nuisance suits a nuisance, he might well be able to place his business affairs in a blind trust and thereby free himself from distraction. This is not a realistic option for damage suits that arise out of past discrete acts rather than alleged ongoing harms. 59 See supra p. 7IO (discussing the breach of the peace language of the Arrest Clause). Obviously, mere refusal to pay damages for a past discrete harm during the tolling of a suit should not be seen as an "ongoing harm." There are ... incidental powers, belonging to the executive department, which are necessarily implied from the nature of the functions, which are confided to it. Among these, must necessarily be included the power to perform them, without any obstruction or impediment whatsoever. The president cannot, therefore, be liable to arrest, imprisonment, or detention, while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office; and for this purpose his person must be deemed, in civil cases at least, to possess an official inviolability.60 Let us note carefully Story's moves. First, Story believes that Section 6 does not exclude immunities for coordinate federal branches. In particular there are "incidental" presidential powers, not textually spelled out but "necessarily implied" by the spare words of Article II. Next, Story hints that these immunities should be understood functionally, not formally -they are deducible from the nature of presidential "functions." Third, Story articulates presidential immunity as an immunity from "arrest" -obviously conjuring up an analogy to the Arrest Clause of Article I, rather than the Speech or Debate Clause.61 Fourth, this immunity is explicitly temporary, once again in keeping with arrest immunity rather than speech or debate immunity. It is immunity "while he is in the discharge of the duties of his office" -while he is in "Session," in the analogous language of Section 6. Fifth, it is immunity even for certain lawsuits based on a President's private conduct -immunity for his "person." Once again, this tracks arrest immunity rather than speech or debate immunity. Finally, Story carefully limits this immunity to "civil cases" -just as the Arrest Clause (but not the Speech or Debate Clause) is limited to civil cases. This quote from Story could be challenged, or narrowly construed, were we writing on a clean slate. Perhaps Story is referring only to technical civil arrests, rather than to broader litigation impediments. In any event, Story is not speaking in his judicial capacity, but only as a commentator on the Constitution (though perhaps its most distinguished commentator), and is writing almost fifty years after the document's ratification.
Today, however, we do not write on a clean slate. We write in the wake of Nixon. A very broad reading of Story is inscribed in the United States Reports -it is the rock on which Nixon is built. If As with the Story quote, these passages support Clinton far more than Nixon. Jefferson is clearly concerned about litigation that would "withdraw" a President from his current "constitutional duties" -a concern inapplicable to Nixon in I982 but very much relevant to Clinton today. As Jefferson put the point three days earlier in words that obviously apply only to sitting Presidents: "To comply with such calls would leave the nation without an executive branch, whose agency, nevertheless, is understood to be so constantly necessary, that it is the sole branch which the constitution requires to be always in function."67 Note also how Jefferson's later reference to "imprisonment for disobedience" conjures up arrest, not speech or debate.
As Adams and Ellsworth's last six words suggest, they too are referring to a sitting President, not a former one: only suits against a sitting President would "stop the whole machine of Government." Significantly, Adams and Ellsworth's language goes beyond technical civil arrest and defines temporary immunity functionally to subsume "any process whatever." Their sweeping quote thus encompasses both civil and criminal prosecutions, yet surely they are not claiming, in light of the Article I, Section 3 Impeachment Clause,68 that a former President may not be criminally punished for offenses in office. Indeed, in language that all of the Nixon opinions overlooked, Adams and Ellsworth explicitly concede as much moments later and thus make clear that
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(19I3) (discussing the delegates); id. at 39 (noting that John Adams was in London). 71 In essence, all three were arguing for litigation immunity rather than substantive immunity for sitting Presidents -immunity from claims made while President rather than for conduct occuring while President. (As Ian Ayres has pointed out to us, the distinction is akin to the claims-made/occurrence distinction in modern insurance policies.) Litigation immunity protects a worthy plaintiff (because it merely postpones suit), whereas substantive immunity does not (because it bars suit). Litigation immunity deters conduct while in office -but conduct that is by hypothesis unconstitutional and should be deterred by the prospect of a later damage suit. Substantive immunity does not chill this conduct; instead it immunizes even clearly unconstitutional actions -and that is why the Founders rejected it. See Of Sovereignty, supra note 38, at I484-92.
If we are concerned that mere litigation immunity will lead to a flood of frivolous lawsuits (or even nonfrivolous but ultimately unworthy ones) against ex-Presidents, we should not recognize a substantive immunity that bars worthy and unworthy claims alike. Instead we should provide for fee-shifting, which discourages plaintiffs with weak claims and yet fully preserves remedies for plaintiffs with winning claims. See id. at II4 n.346. If Congress fears that the threat of liability for good faith mistakes will overdeter and paralyze Presidents (or other officials, for that matter), Congress need only provide for indemnification for good faith mistakes, for which government is in effect the better risk bearer than its employees in a Coasean world. See id. at II5; Fourth Amendment, supra note 28, at 8I2. Despite what the pundits are saying, Clinton has a far stronger case than Nixon had.
In light of this analysis the real timing difference between Nixon and Clinton is not East

II. POSSIBLE PRIVILEGES
The concept of a President's immunity from functional "Arrest" while in "Session" is a modest one -waivable, temporary, and perhaps subject to congressional modification. Yet from another perspective, arrest immunity is absolute and categorical -it does not balance or weigh the unique features of a given case. It does not distinguish between a case likely to arrest the President in litigation for two hours, and one likely to arrest him for two months. It does not focus on the equities of a particular plaintiff or her special need for speedy adjudication. It does not reflect the fact that some claims are more difficult than others to revive and to adjudicate after a long delay.
For some, the bright-line quality of arrest immunity -supported by a textual analogy to the bright-line rule of Article I, Section 6, by the categorical language of Story, Jefferson, and Adams,75 and by the prospect that political pressure can be trusted to induce presidential waiver in appropriate cases -will count as a juridical virtue. For others, the medicine of absolute arrest immunity will taste too strong.
For those in this second group -scholars, lawyers, and judges -we shall briefly provide a catalogue of weaker prescriptions: presidential privileges attentive to the structural arguments and historical evidence presented above but packaged in lower dosages and blended with other general legal principles.
A. Equitable Tolling
In some situations, arrest immunity may work a grave injustice against a worthy and diligent plaintiff. Imagine a pedestrian crushed by a transition team bus (with Clinton at the wheel) one week before the Clinton inauguration. Obviously there is no time to file suit, conduct discovery, litigate the case, and pursue an appeal before Inauguration Day. This plaintiff might have to pay huge out-of-pocket hospital bills and yet, under absolute arrest immunity, may be forced to wait eight years to be made whole.
A more flexible, "equitable" version of presidential immunity would distinguish between cases in which a plaintiff could have brought suit before Inauguration Day and cases in which a plaintiff could not. The structural logic here is the same one that drives arrest immunity: a suit against a sitting President in effect impleads innocent third parties -the American people -whose democratically chosen leader is obstructed in discharging his unique and awesome constitutional duties. 74 See supra p. 702 . 75 See supra Part I.C. dent's memory of the facts of any one case will no doubt fade over eight years, while she is preoccupied by many and weighty matters of state, whereas a single-minded plaintiff may be able to rehearse his story over the years. This concern can vividly arise in a case turning on facts more than on law, especially if testimonial credibility is a key issue. By strategically manipulating the timing of a lawsuit -delaying without good reason until after Inauguration -a plaintiff may place a President who deserves to win the suit in a cruel trilemma: drop vital affairs of state to litigate now and prevail (the "betray the people/waiver" option), or pay off unmeritorious claims (the "nuisance value/extortion floodgates" option), or wait until out of office and defend at a disadvantage (the "can't remember/look like a liar or a dope" option). To discourage precisely this kind of strategic manipulation, Anglo-American law has long recognized the general doctrine of laches.79
Laches is a defense that allows a case to be dismissed if the plaintiff cannot explain why he sat on his claims and if his delay substantially prejudices the defendant.80 For example, the Supreme Court held over a century ago that a plaintiff alleging fraud could not needlessly delay a suit until after the alleged defrauder's death and thereby prevail more easily against the alleged defrauder's successors in interest.8' This logic could easily be blended with arguments from consti- Of course, our old friend expressio unius might argue that, if the Framers had meant for the President to enjoy an analogous venue privilege, they would have explicitly so provided in Article III alongside the Ambassador Clause. But perhaps the Framers were simply not thinking about the unusual case of a civil damage action against a sitting President. When they did think about suits against the President, they explicitly provided that impeachment trials would take place in the Senate, again in the nation's capital. The Federalist Papers explicitly emphasized the geographic logic that underlay this choice. 89 Recall also Jefferson's obviously geographic concern that litigation in "the several courts" (note the plural) would "bandy [the President] from pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from north to south & east to west, and withdraw him" from the district and thus from "his constitutional duties."90 Few at the Founding would have thought that any court on the continent could use newfangled longarm statutes to reach out and grab the President of the United States.9' Jefferson summed it up nicely, in words that also sum up nicely much of our overall argument:
[Vol. 108:701 they would, should we receive a similar one, to attend the trials of Blennerhasset and others, in the Mississippi territory, those instituted at St. Louis and other places on the western waters, or at any place, other than the seat of government. To comply with such calls would leave the nation without an executive branch, whose agency, nevertheless, is understood to be so constantly necessary, that it is the sole branch which the constitution requires to be always in function. It could not then mean that it should be withdrawn from its station by any co-ordinate authority.92
III. CONCLUSION
In the end, we suggest that temporary immunity from arrest is the constitutionally preferable reading of executive immunity in many situations. This immunity, which essentially tolls cases against a sitting President, avoids the twin dangers of making all Americans pay for the President's sins and of putting Presidents above the law. Our "arresting" conclusion is that a proper judicial holding in Clinton's favor could limit rather than extend the mischief of Nixon. 
